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INTRODUCTION 
Mass incarceration not only disenfranchises millions of Americans, 
disproportionately people of color, it also increases the voting power 
of predominantly white rural areas where prisons are located.  People 
in prison are counted towards representation while being excluded 
from the franchise. 
Every ten years, the Census Bureau counts the entire United States 
population.1  Each individual is counted at his or her “usual 
residence,” the home where he or she lives or sleeps most of the 
time.2  Legislative seats are apportioned, and electoral district lines 
drawn, based on that Census count.3  For purposes of the Census, the 
approximately 2.2 million people in prison in the United States are 
counted as residents of the district in which they are incarcerated, not 
                                                                                                                 
 1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (“The actual Enumeration shall be made within 
three Years after the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within 
every subsequent Term of ten Years . . . .”); see Decennial Census of Population and 
Housing, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/decennial-
census.html [https://perma.cc/3STB-HZUU]. 
 2. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, RESIDENCE RULE AND RESIDENCE SITUATIONS 
FOR THE 2010 CENSUS, at para. 2 [hereinafter RESIDENCE RULE AND RESIDENCE 
SITUATIONS], https://www.census.gov/population/www/cen2010/resid_rules/resid_
rules.html [https://perma.cc/63W7-X8T4]. 
 3. 2 U.S.C.A. § 2a(a) (West 2017). 
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of their home prior to incarceration.4  In all but two states, individuals 
incarcerated for a felony conviction are also ineligible to vote.5  
Consequently, they become non-voting “residents” of the district in 
which they are incarcerated, represented by a legislator over whom 
they have no electoral influence.   
The practice of counting people who are incarcerated and ineligible 
to vote as residents of their prison cell inflates the population count in 
districts where prisons are located.6  It increases the voting strength of 
those districts’ other residents relative to the residents of neighboring 
districts, and dilutes the voting strength of prisoners’ home 
communities.7  At the same time, correctional facilities are not 
dispersed evenly throughout most states, but are often found in more 
rural, predominantly white areas, while people incarcerated in these 
facilities are disproportionately people of color from comparatively 
urban areas.8  Counting prisoners as residents of the district where 
they are incarcerated shifts political power from urban to more rural 
areas.9  The confluence of prisoners’ ineligibility to vote, an increase 
in the United States’ prison population in recent decades, and the 
treatment of people in prison as “residents” of the district where they 
are incarcerated has skewed legislative apportionment and the 
distribution of political power.  Counting people in prison as residents 
of their home prior to incarceration will begin to address this 
imbalance. 
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I provides background on 
felony disenfranchisement, mass incarceration, and the cascading 
effects of both on electoral apportionment.  Part II discusses the 
decennial Census, its application of the “usual residence” rule to 
other people who live in “group quarters,” including military 
                                                                                                                 
 4. See RESIDENCE RULE AND RESIDENCE SITUATIONS, supra note 2, at para. 16. 
 5. See ACLU ET AL., DEMOCRACY IMPRISONED: A REVIEW OF THE PREVALENCE 
AND IMPACT OF FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES, at 
app. B (2013) [hereinafter DEMOCRACY IMPRISONED], http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/
Treaties/CCPR/Shared%20Documents/USA/INT_CCPR_NGO_USA_15128_E.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2HK5-EDQW] (highlighting that only Maine and Vermont 
residents maintain their right to vote despite a felony conviction). 
 6. See Dale E. Ho, Captive Constituents: Prison-Based Gerrymandering and the 
Current Redistricting Cycle, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 355, 355 (2011). 
 7. See id. at 360. 
 8. See Impact on Demographic Data, PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE, 
https://www.prisonersofthecensus.org/problem/statistics.html [https://perma.cc/
GXG5-CSNF] (“According to Department of Agriculture Demographer Calvin 
Beale, although most prisoners are from urban areas, 60% of new prison construction 
takes place in non-metro regions.”). 
 9. See Ho, supra note 6, at 364. 
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personnel and college students, and how these groups are treated for 
purposes of legislative apportionment.  Part III then analyzes the 
application of the “usual residence” rule to prisoners, and reviews 
recent federal court challenges to apportionment schemes that count 
people in prison as “residents” of the district in which they are 
incarcerated.  Part IV discusses how New York and Maryland have 
successfully addressed the issue of counting people in prisons by 
designating them as residents of their prior address for purposes of 
legislative apportionment.  Part V discusses states’ and localities’ 
options for improving equality in apportionment before redistricting 
based on the 2020 Census. 
I.  MASS INCARCERATION: DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND THE 
DISTORTION OF DEMOCRACY 
Mass incarceration, combined with felony disenfranchisement, 
compromises the most fundamental aspect of democracy by removing 
the right to vote from millions of Americans.  Section I.A provides 
basic statistics about the acceleration in the United States’ use of 
prisons and the resulting era of mass incarceration.  Section I.B 
discusses the racially discriminatory roots of laws that remove 
citizens’ eligibility to vote after a criminal conviction, commonly 
referred to as “felony disenfranchisement,” and the electoral impact 
of felony disenfranchisement in the era of mass incarceration. 
A. Mass Incarceration 
The United States currently convicts and incarcerates its citizens at 
an historically unparalleled rate.  In the United States, 85.9 million 
people have a criminal record.10  Today, almost 2.2 million people are 
being held in prisons or jails,11 and over 4.6 million are under some 
other sort of community supervision, such as parole or probation.12  
The United States’ incarceration rate increased sharply beginning in 
                                                                                                                 
 10. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SURVEY OF 
STATE CRIMINAL HISTORY INFORMATION SYSTEMS, 2014, at tbl.21 (2015), 
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bjs/grants/249799.pdf [https://perma.cc/P35X-AKWE]. 
 11. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, KEY STATISTICS: 
TOTAL ADULT CORRECTIONAL POPULATION, 1980–2015 [hereinafter KEY 
STATISTICS], https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=kfdetail&iid=487 [https://perma.cc/
7JTA-5KD3] (follow link next to “download data”) (data on file with the Fordham 
Urban Law Journal). 
 12. See id.; see also Danielle Kaeble & Lauren Glaze, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Correctional Populations in the United States, 2015, BULL. NO. 
NCJ 250374, Dec. 2016, at 2 tbl.1, https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus15.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8GDX-Y96B]. 
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the 1980s, with the “war on drugs.”13  In 1980, approximately 500,000 
people were incarcerated.14  The number of people reached over 1.1 
million in 1990, and more than 1.9 million in 2000.15  By the close of 
2010, 1,404,000 people were behind bars in state prisons, 748,700 in 
local jails, and 209,800 in federal facilities, totaling more than 2.2 
million people incarcerated.16  At the same time, the number of 
people under criminal justice supervision was almost 7 million.17 
Mass incarceration and its collateral consequences, such as loss of 
voting rights, disproportionately affect people of color.18  There are 
significant racial disparities at nearly every stage of the criminal 
justice system, including, inter alia, disparities in police stops,19 
arrests,20 prosecutions,21 convictions,22 imprisonment,23 and length of 
                                                                                                                 
 13. MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE 
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 60 (2011). 
 14. See KEY STATISTICS, supra note 11; see also Lauren E. Glaze & Thomas P. 
Bonczar, Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Probation and Parole in 
the United States, 2010, BULL. NO. NCJ 236019, Nov. 2011, at 3, https://www.bjs.gov/
content/pub/pdf/ppus10.pdf [https://perma.cc/225G-DZ37] (noting that about 1.3 
million people were under some form of community supervision in 1980). 
 15. See KEY STATISTICS, supra note 11. See generally Allen J. Beck & Paige M. 
Harrison, Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Prisoners in 2000, BULL. 
NO. NCJ 88207, Aug. 2001, at 1, https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p00.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/899A-4W3X]. 
 16. See KEY STATISTICS, supra note 11; see also Mass Incarceration, ACLU, 
https://www.aclu.org/issues/mass-incarceration [https://perma.cc/PNT3-EADW]. 
 17. See KEY STATISTICS, supra note 11; see also DEMOCRACY IMPRISONED, supra 
note 5, at 1. 
 18. See Marc Mauer, Addressing Racial Disparities in Incarceration, 91 PRISON J. 
(SUPPLEMENT) 87S, 89S–92S (2011), http://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/
addressing-racial-disparities-in-incarceration [https://perma.cc/8Q72-DBNA] (noting 
that in examining arrest rates, racial disparities in the arrests may reflect law 
enforcement behavior in the arrest and prosecution stages, in addition to involvement 
in crime). 
 19. See Christine Eith & Matthew R. Durose, Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, Contacts Between Police and the Public Declined from 2002 to 2008, 
BULL. NO. NCJ 234599, Oct. 2011, at 1, https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/
cpp08.pdf [https://perma.cc/H8KV-8KZ3] (finding that black drivers were three times 
more likely to be searched during a stop than white drivers.); see also Floyd v. City of 
New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 662 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding disproportionate 
suspicionless stops or frisks of African-Americans in Fourteenth Amendment 
selective law enforcement case). 
 20. See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, REPORT OF THE SENTENCING PROJECT TO THE 
UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE REGARDING RACIAL DISPARITIES IN 
THE UNITED STATES CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 4 (2013) [hereinafter SENTENCING 
PROJECT UNHRC REPORT] (citing Katherine Beckett et al., Race, Drugs, and 
Policing: Understanding Disparities in Drug Delivery Arrests, 44 CRIMINOLOGY 105, 
106 (2006)), http://sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Race-and-
Justice-Shadow-Report-ICCPR.pdf [https://perma.cc/F3T3-8SWP] (providing a 
striking example: “[b]etween 1980 and 2000, the U.S. black drug arrest rate rose from 
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sentence.24  These disparities lead to the disproportionate 
imprisonment of people of color.25  For example, Black and Latino 
offenders sentenced in state and federal courts face significantly 
greater odds of incarceration than similarly situated white offenders,26 
and receive longer sentences than their white counterparts.27 
At the same time, prisons are often located in predominantly 
white, rural areas.28  Despite studies that show better outcomes when 
individuals convicted of a crime are treated in smaller community-
based programs,29 people are often incarcerated far from their 
home.30  Rural areas suffering from the loss of farming or 
                                                                                                                 
6.5 to 29.1 per 1,000 persons; during the same period, the white drug arrest rate 
increased from 3.5 to 4.6 per 1,000 persons”). 
 21. See id. at 9–10. 
 22. See id. at 1. 
 23. See ASHLEY NELLIS, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, THE COLOR OF JUSTICE: 
RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN STATE PRISONS 4–5 (2016) (citing U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NATIONAL PRISONER STATISTICS, 1978–
2014), http://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/The-Color-of-
Justice-Racial-and-Ethnic-Disparity-in-State-Prisons.pdf [https://perma.cc/HUJ7-
DZ3K] (noting that African Americans are incarcerated in state prisons at a rate that 
is 5.1 times the imprisonment of whites). 
 24. See SENTENCING PROJECT UNHRC REPORT, supra note 20, at 12–16. 
 25. See id. at 3, 14. 
 26. Id. at 2 (citing E. Ann Carson & William J. Sabol, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Prisoners in 2011, BULL. NO. NCJ 239808, Dec. 2012, at tbl.8). 
 27. See generally Cassia C. Spohn, Thirty Years of Sentencing Reform: The Quest 
for a Racially Neutral Sentencing Process, 3 CRIM. JUST. 427, 428 (2000), 
http://www.justicestudies.com/pubs/livelink3-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/H5RQ-X27D]. 
 28. See Ho, supra note 6, at 362–63; see also infra Sections IV.A, IV.B (discussing 
with greater particularity prisons housing primarily urban and disproportionately 
African American persons in rural areas). 
 29. See James Gilligan, Punishment Fails. Rehabilitation Works., N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 19, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/12/18/prison-could-be-
productive/punishment-fails-rehabilitation-works [https://perma.cc/B2HT-ENPK]; 
Brian Kincade, The Economics of the American Prison System, SMART ASSET 
(Feb. 3, 2017), https://smartasset.com/mortgage/the-economics-of-the-american-
prison-system [https://perma.cc/9SC5-RJ4K]; see also John M. Eason, The Prison 
Business Is Booming in Rural America and There’s No End in Sight, BUS. INSIDER 
(Mar. 13, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/prison-industry-boom-rural-america-
2017-3 [https://perma.cc/CMX9-KCYA]; Peter T. Kilborn, Rural Towns Turn to 
Prisons to Reignite Their Economies, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2001), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/08/01/us/rural-towns-turn-to-prisons-to-reignite-their-
economies.html [https://nyti.ms/2lt3Kug]. 
 30. See, e.g., PETER WAGNER, PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE, IMPORTED 
“CONSTITUENTS”: INCARCERATED PEOPLE AND POLITICAL CLOUT IN CONNECTICUT 5 
(2013), https://www.prisonersofthecensus.org/ct/report_2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/
8KSK-TWM9] (discussing the status of gerrymandering in multiple states).  For more 
examples, see generally Importing Constituents Series, PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE, 
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports.html#electoral-issues [https://perma.cc/Y77Q-
3S5A] (detailing reports on Massachusetts, California, Minnesota, Wisconsin, 
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manufacturing jobs have seen prisons built in their areas, based, in 
part, on the promise that prisons provide local economic 
development.31  Although prison companies have invested heavily in 
selling the development myth,32 corrections-related jobs arguably do 
not compensate local economies for the counterbalancing tax breaks 
and economic incentives and, more broadly, do not account for the 
financial and social costs of incarceration.33 
The geographic location of prisons not only separates people 
incarcerated from their families and communities, it also results in the 
reallocation of political power from cities to more rural areas.  A 
series of Prison Policy Initiative reports illustrate this point: in 
Connecticut, for example, the prison population disproportionately 
comes from the five largest cities (Bridgeport, Hartford, New Haven, 
Stamford, and Westbury), but prisons are concentrated in just a few 
areas, with sixty-five percent of the state’s prison beds located in just 
five towns (Cheshire, East Lyme, Enfield, Somers, and Suffield).34  In 
Massachusetts, prisons’ locations have led to electoral inequality in 
the seven towns that use a “representative town meeting” form of 
government, where prisoners are counted as members of the district 
but cannot participate in the town meetings where decisions are 
made.35  In Pennsylvania, forty percent of the people in state prisons 
are from Philadelphia, while all but one percent are incarcerated 
outside of the city and counted in the eight state house districts where 
they are incarcerated.36  The same pattern was seen in New York and 
                                                                                                                 
Tennessee, New York, Nevada, and Montana); DAVID SHAPIRO, ACLU, BANKING 
ON BONDAGE: PRIVATE PRISONS AND MASS INCARCERATION (2011), 
https://www.aclu.org/banking-bondage-private-prisons-and-mass-incarceration?re
direct=prisoners-rights/banking-bondage-private-prisons-and-mass-incarceration 
[https://perma.cc/T8AD-SW3D]. 
 31. See SHAPIRO, supra note 30, at 18; see also Who Benefits When a Private 
Prison Comes to Town?, NPR (Nov. 5, 2011), https://www.npr.org/2011/11/
05/142058047/who-benefits-when-a-private-prison-comes-to-town [https://perma.cc/
8F9F-7J4E]. 
 32. See SHAPIRO, supra note 30, at 38. 
 33. See id. at 18–31, 40. 
 34. See WAGNER, supra note 30, at 2. 
 35. See Aleks Kajstura, Prison Gerrymandering in Massachusetts: How the 
Census Bureau Prison Miscount Invites Phantom Constituents to Town Meeting, 
PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Oct. 13, 2010), https://www.prisonersofthecensus.org/ma/
towns.html [https://perma.cc/6362-6QEE]. 
 36. In one district—District 69—ninety-two percent of the district’s African 
American population cannot vote because they are incarcerated. See PETER 
WAGNER & ELENA LAVARREDA, PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE, IMPORTING 
CONSTITUENTS: PRISONERS AND POLITICAL CLOUT IN PENNSYLVANIA, at pt. II (2009), 
https://www.prisonersofthecensus.org/pennsylvania/importing.html [https://perma.cc/
3P54-Q5RT]. 
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Maryland, until they reformed their methods of apportionment, as 
discussed in Sections IV.A and IV.B. 
The United States’ overuse of incarceration and the shift of 
electoral power from urban to rural areas has skewed legislative 
apportionment and equitable electoral districting. 
B. Felony Disenfranchisement 
Felony disenfranchisement is the loss of a citizen’s eligibility to 
register and vote due to a criminal conviction.37  In all but two states, 
citizens lose the right to vote upon conviction of a felony.  Four states 
permanently ban all persons with a felony conviction from voting.38  
Twenty states ban all persons with a felony conviction from voting 
until they have completed their sentence, including prison, parole, 
and probation.39  Six states require completion of sentence and 
impose post-sentence restrictions, such as a waiting period, before 
voting rights can be restored.40  Four states prohibit those with a 
felony conviction from voting while in prison or on parole.41  And 
fourteen states ban voting with a felony conviction while 
incarcerated.42  Only Maine and Vermont allow all eligible citizens to 
vote, even if they are incarcerated.43 
Felony disenfranchisement severely alters our democratic model.  
The numbers are stark.  If all of the citizens nationwide who are 
disenfranchised due to a prior conviction populated their own state, it 
would be the twentieth largest state in the country and would have 
ten votes in the Electoral College.44  Without felony 
                                                                                                                 
 37. See DEMOCRACY IMPRISONED, supra note 5. 
 38. See Felony Disenfranchisement Laws (Map), ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/
issues/voting-rights/criminal-re-enfranchisement/state-criminal-re-enfranchisement-
laws-map [https://perma.cc/6RWQ-8YYP] (showing the four states, Florida, Iowa, 
Kentucky, and Virginia, in red); see also CHRISTOPHER UGGEN ET AL., THE 
SENTENCING PROJECT, 6 MILLION LOST VOTERS: STATE-LEVEL ESTIMATES OF 
FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT 3–4 (2016) [hereinafter 6 MILLION LOST VOTERS], 
http://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/6-Million-Lost-
Voters.pdf [https://perma.cc/GJH5-VTT4]. 
 39. Felony Disenfranchisement Laws (Map), supra note 38 (showing states in 
yellow). 
 40. Id. (showing states in orange). 
 41. Id. (showing states in dark blue). 
 42. Id. (showing states in light blue). 
 43. Id. (showing states in green). 
 44. Chris Kirk, How Powerful Is Your Vote, SLATE (Nov. 2, 2012), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/map_of_the_week/2012/11/presidenti
al_election_a_map_showing_the_vote_power_of_all_50_states.html [https://perma.cc/
8WC5-2NFQ]. 
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disenfranchisement, the large number of citizens with a conviction 
could affect not only local, but state and federal electoral outcomes, 
were they permitted to vote. 
Compared to other democratic nations, the United States is an 
outlier in how it treats citizens with a conviction.45  In broad terms, 
other democracies’ disenfranchisement policies range from no ban on 
voting to limited, targeted bans, often only during a term of 
incarceration.46  Other nations’ courts have limited 
disenfranchisement to circumstances where the state could 
demonstrate that it was justified,47 or prohibited disenfranchisement 
outright.48  In all, the United States not only leads the world in its rate 
of incarcerating its citizens,49 it is also one of the strictest democracies 
in terms of denying citizens the right to vote due to a conviction, 
which skews democratic representation and diminishes representation 
of the interests of citizens with a felony conviction.50 
1. Historical Origins of Felony Disenfranchisement 
Felony disenfranchisement has a long, shameful history in the 
United States.  It proliferated soon after the Civil War, when white 
voters sought to block Black citizens from gaining political power.51  
The United States Constitution was amended to provide specific 
                                                                                                                 
 45. See LALEH ISPAHANI, ACLU, OUT OF STEP WITH THE WORLD: AN ANALYSIS 
OF FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT IN THE U.S. AND OTHER DEMOCRACIES 4 (2006), 
http://felonvoting.procon.org/sourcefiles/aclu-felon-voting-report-2006.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/M4Z5-6X3H]; Reuven Ziegler, Legal Outlier, Again?  U.S. Felon 
Suffrage: Comparative and International Human Rights Perspectives, 29 B.U. INT’L 
L.J. 197, 210 (2011) (arguing that “an identifiable global trajectory has emerged 
towards the expansion of felon suffrage.  American jurisprudence lies outside of this 
global trajectory . . . ”). 
 46. See ISPAHANI, supra note 45, at 6 tbl.1. 
 47. See Sauve v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519, paras. 31–
33 (Can.) (holding that the “universal franchise has become . . . an essential part of 
democracy . . . if we accept that governmental power in a democracy flows from the 
citizens, it is difficult to see how that power can legitimately be used to disenfranchise 
the very citizens from whom the government’s power flows”); HCJ 2757/06 Hilla 
Alrai v. Minister of the Interior 50(2) PD 18 (1996) (Isr.). 
 48. August v. Electoral Commission, 1999 (3) SA 1 (CC) at 23 para. 17 (S. Afr.). 
 49. See SENTENCING PROJECT UNHRC REPORT, supra note 20, at 1. 
 50. See ISPAHANI, supra note 45, at 33; ACLU OF FLORIDA, JOINT SUBMISSION TO 
ICCPR: UNITED STATES’ COMPLIANCE WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON 
CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 2–3 (2012), http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CCPR/
Shared%20Documents/USA/INT_CCPR_NGO_USA_14528_E.pdf [https://perma.cc/
P94B-WW9W]; see also Ziegler, supra note 45, at 265–66. 
 51. Angela Behrens & Christopher Uggen, Ballot Manipulation and the “Menace 
of Negro Domination”: Racial Threat and Felon Disenfranchisement in the United 
States, 1850–2002, 109 AM. J. SOC. 559, 561 (2003). 
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protections for voting in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments,52 which recognized the citizenship of all persons “born 
or naturalized in the United States,” provided all persons with “equal 
protection of the laws,” and prohibited the denial or abridgement of 
the right to vote on account of race.53  These amendments, known as 
the “Reconstruction Amendments,” superseded state laws that 
explicitly prohibited African-Americans from voting.  Effective 
enforcement, however, was a different story.54  The Fourteenth 
Amendment left open the ability to deny or abridge the right to vote 
for “participation in rebellion, or other crime.”55  In the wake of these 
amendments, Southern states used criminal disfranchisement and 
other policies to roll back the expansion of the franchise.56 
Despite the racially discriminatory effects of felony 
disenfranchisement, challenges to state disenfranchisement regimes 
were largely unsuccessful based on courts’ interpretation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment provision allowing states to deny the right to 
vote for “participation in . . . crime.”57  In Richardson v. Ramirez,58 
the Supreme Court dealt a heavy blow to voting rights when it 
decided that “the exclusion of felons from the vote has an affirmative 
sanction in [Section] 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment,” which 
distinguished the constitutional protection against felony 
disenfranchisement laws from other state limitations on the 
franchise.59 
                                                                                                                 
 52. See Landmark Legislation: Thirteenth, Fourteenth, & Fifteenth Amendments, 
U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/generic/Civil
WarAmendments.htm [https://perma.cc/UQR2-R6Q9]. 
 53. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, XV (alterations in original). 
 54. Although this Article focuses on formal legal protections for voting rights, a 
prominent source of disenfranchisement during this era came from terrorist 
organizations such as the Ku Klux Klan that, often sanctioned by local officials, used 
violence and intimidation to prevent African American citizens from voting.  For 
additional historical information outside the scope of this Article, see generally ARI 
BERMAN, GIVE US THE BALLOT: THE MODERN STRUGGLE FOR VOTING RIGHTS IN 
AMERICA (2015); Introduction to Federal Voting Rights, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. 
(Aug. 6, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/crt/introduction-federal-voting-rights-laws 
[https://perma.cc/N895-CL8Y]. 
 55. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 2; see Richardson, 418 U.S. at 56. 
 56. See ALEXANDER, supra note 13, at 30; BERMAN, supra note 54, at 11. 
 57. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 2; see Richardson, 418 U.S. at 54. 
 58. 418 U.S. 24 (1974). 
 59. Id. at 54 (alterations in original).  In Richardson, plaintiffs with felony 
convictions who had completed their sentences argued that California’s 
disenfranchisement law violated their Equal Protection rights. Id.  The Court held, 
“the exclusion of felons from the vote has an affirmative sanction particular to 
[Section] 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id.  Section 2 provides: “[b]ut when the 
right to vote at any election  . . . is denied  . . . or in any way abridged, except for 
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It was not until the 1985 decision in Hunter v. Underwood60 that 
the Supreme Court held a criminal disenfranchisement law 
intentionally racially discriminatory and therefore unconstitutional.  
The Alabama Constitution, approved in 1901, disqualified from 
voting any citizen convicted of a “crime involving moral turpitude.”61  
Although the provision “may at first seem racially neutral . . . the 
drafters intentionally sought to subvert the [Fourteenth] and 
[Fifteenth] Amendments’ protection against racial discrimination in 
voting by using the moral turpitude provision, in conjunction with 
discriminatory criminal justice enforcement, to target Alabama’s 
Black citizens.”62  The provision provides an example of how 
purportedly race-neutral criminal disfranchisement laws were tailored 
to principally affect African-Americans and have had the greatest 
impact on African-Americans.63  The Court in Hunter held that, 
consistent with Richardson, “[Section] 2 was not designed to permit 
the purposeful racial discrimination attending the enactment and 
operation of [state law] which otherwise violates [Section] 1 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”64 
2. Electoral Impact of Felon Disenfranchisement in an Era of Mass 
Incarceration 
Over six million Americans are currently disenfranchised due to a 
felony conviction.65  The overall disenfranchisement rate has 
increased dramatically in conjunction with the growing United States 
                                                                                                                 
participation in rebellion, or other crime[.]” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 2.  The Court 
determined that Section 1 “could not have been meant to bar outright a form of 
disenfranchisement which was expressly exempted from” Section 2. Richardson, 418 
U.S. at 55.  Justices Marshall and Brennan dissented, asserting that the proper test 
should be whether a State could show a “compelling state interest” to justify 
exclusion of ex-felons from the franchise. Id. at 77–78 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  
Justice Douglas dissented as well, but did not join in this portion of Justice Marshall’s 
dissent. See id. at 86. 
 60. 471 U.S. 222, 223 (1985). 
 61. See id. at 223. 
 62. See id. at 229 (explaining the state’s moral turpitude provision was meant “to 
establish white supremacy”). 
 63. See id. 
 64. Id. at 233 (alterations in original) (regarding the argument that Section 2 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment authorized the disfranchisement of persons convicted of 
crimes, the Court held, “we are confident that [Section] 2 was not designed to permit 
the purposeful racial discrimination attending the enactment and operation of [state 
law] which otherwise violates [Section] 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Nothing in 
our opinion in Richardson v. Ramirez . . . suggests to the contrary.”). 
 65. See 6 MILLION LOST VOTERS, supra note 38, at 3. 
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prison population.66  The number of citizens disenfranchised has more 
than quadrupled in the past few decades—from approximately 1.17 
million in 1976 to 3.34 million by 1996, and to 6.1 million by 2016—
with the unprecedented growth in the sheer number of Americans 
incarcerated or kept under criminal justice supervision.67 
Felony disenfranchisement laws have continued to 
disproportionately impact people of color.  At present, for example, 
7.7% of the African-American voting-age population, or one out of 
every thirteen Black adults is disenfranchised due to a conviction.68  
This rate is four times greater than the rest of the voting-age 
population, which has a disenfranchisement rate of 1.8%.69  
Nationwide, 2.2 million African-Americans are disenfranchised on 
the basis of a conviction, more than 40% of whom have completed the 
terms of their sentences.70  Felony disenfranchisement also has a 
pronounced impact in individual states, particularly those with large 
prison populations, disenfranchisement that extends beyond an 
incarcerative sentence, and exceedingly restrictive voting rights 
restoration processes.71   
The assault on voting rights is threefold.  First, state felony 
disenfranchisement laws remove a citizen’s eligibility to vote,72 which 
prevents democratic participation.  Second, mass incarceration 
removes people, and disproportionately people of color, from their 
home communities and holds them in prisons.  Third, redistricting 
and prison gerrymandering then dilutes the electoral power of those 
same citizens’ home communities, and hands their electoral power to 
the residents of the district in which they are incarcerated.73 
Policy choices about where and how individuals are incarcerated 
matter for voting rights.  Incarcerating people far away from their 
                                                                                                                 
 66. See supra Section I.A. 
 67. See 6 MILLION LOST VOTERS, supra note 38, at 3; see also Hadar Aviram et 
al., Felon Disenfranchisement, 13 ANN. REV. SOC. SCI. 295, 300 (2017). 
 68. See CHRISTOPHER UGGEN ET AL., THE SENTENCING PROJECT, STATE-LEVEL 
ESTIMATES OF FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, 2010, at 1–2 
(2012), http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/fd_State_Level_
Estimates_of_Felon_Disen_2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/W5MZ-RERY]. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 17. 
 71. This includes, most prominently, the three states with permanent 
disenfranchisement (Florida, Iowa, and Kentucky). See Criminal Disenfranchisement 
Laws Across the United States, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (Oct. 6, 2016), 
http://www.brennancenter.org/criminal-disenfranchisement-laws-across-united-states 
[https://perma.cc/Q48A-NXUL]. 
 72. See DEMOCRACY IMPRISONED, supra note 5; see also supra Section I.B. 
 73. See Ho, supra note 6, at 364; see also supra Section I.B.2. 
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homes effectively removes residents—disproportionately people of 
color—from urban areas and credits their voting strength to more 
rural areas, thus altering the composition of electoral districts and 
according more power to the votes in districts with prisons and 
prisoners who cannot vote.74  This gives the votes of voters in a 
district containing a prison more weight because the total population 
(including non-voting prisoners) has grown, even though the voting 
population has not changed.75  At the same time, it deflates the 
weight of votes in areas targeted for criminal justice enforcement, 
which tend to include urban areas, exacerbating the cycle of 
democratic exclusion.76  By relocating a concentration of 
disenfranchised citizens from primarily urban areas to rural areas 
where they do not have a representative accountable to their 
interests, the combination of felony disenfranchisement and prison 
districting severely disrupts representational democracy.77 
II.  REDISTRICTING AND COUNTING PRISONERS 
Section II.A provides background on the explicit constitutional 
requirements related to counting the population, apportionment, and 
redistricting.  Section II.B explains the “usual residence” rule, 
established by the Census Act of 1790.  Section II.C explains how the 
“usual residence” rule has been applied to other inhabitants of 
“group quarters,” specifically overseas federal employees, residents of 
domestic military bases, and college students.  This Article argues 
that courts’ treatment of these groups demonstrates that careful 
review and consideration of groups’ insularity or community ties 
should factor into the determination of whether they should be 
considered residents for purposes of apportionment.  This Article 
concludes that the same consideration should be made for prisoners, 
which will often result in their exclusion from the population base of 
the place that they are incarcerated. 
                                                                                                                 
 74. See Ho, supra note 6, at 370–71. 
 75. If three voters and a prison population of seven constitute one district, and ten 
voters constitute a neighboring district, the three voters’ votes have more weight than 
the ten neighboring voters: the three voters’ representative has equal authority as the 
representative from the neighboring district, who represents ten voters. 
 76. See Ho, supra note 6, at 370–71, 390. 
 77. See infra Part III. 
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A. Constitutional Requirements 
The decennial Census is a full count of the nation’s population.78  It 
is constitutionally required: an “actual enumeration” of persons in 
each state must be conducted every ten years, in the manner 
prescribed by federal law,79 and the apportionment of congressional 
representatives must be determined every ten years on the basis of 
that count.80   
For purposes of redistricting, the Supreme Court has interpreted 
the Equal Protection clause to require jurisdictions to abide by the 
one-person, one-vote principle.81  That principle requires states to 
draw congressional districts with populations that are as close to 
equal as possible,82 but may also accommodate traditional districting 
principles, such as compactness, maintaining communities of interest, 
observing political subdivisions, and considering incumbents, 
particularly in state and local districting plans, which are given more 
leeway.83 
                                                                                                                 
 78. See Decennial Census of Population and Housing, supra note 1. 
 79. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (“The actual Enumeration shall be made within 
three Years after the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within 
every subsequent Term of ten Years . . . .”). 
 80. Id. (“Representatives . . . shall be apportioned among the several 
States . . . according to their respective Numbers . . . .”); see 2 U.S.C.A. § 2a(a) (West 
2017). 
 81. See Tennant v. Jefferson Cty. Comm’n, 567 U.S. 758, 760–63 (2012) (holding 
that states must justify population deviations among districts with “legitimate state 
objectives”); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964) (requiring that states 
apportion seats in the state legislature on the basis of the population); Wesberry v. 
Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1964) (holding that Congressional districts must be drawn 
with equal populations); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963) (establishing the 
“one person, one vote” theory); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 191–92 (1962) (holding 
that malapportionment claims are justiciable). See generally Evenwel v. Abbott, 
136 S. Ct. 1120, 1123–24 (2016). 
 82. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 730, 734 (1983) (establishing that for 
congressional reapportionment “there are no de minimis population 
variations . . . which could practicably be avoided”).  Any deviation, “no matter how 
small,” must be justified by a legitimate state interest. Id. at 730.  State and local 
redistricting plans are given slightly more leeway. 
 83. See Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 530–31 (1969).  Districting plans 
must satisfy both the constitutional one-person, one-vote requirement and 
requirements that ensure that they satisfactorily maintain actual communities of 
interest, for example, balancing the number of schools across districts in a school 
board districting plan; that they are contiguous (all parts of a district are connected at 
some point with the rest of the district); that they do not unnecessarily pit incumbents 
against one another in a combined district; and that they are reasonably compact 
according to a visual inspection of district lines. See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 977–
78 (1996).  Another measure used to examine a districting plan is the Reock scores 
for each of the districts. See Daniel McGlone, Measuring District Compactness in 
PostGIS, AZAVEA (July 11, 2016), https://www.azavea.com/blog/2016/07/11/
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For state and local district drawing, the Supreme Court established 
a “safe-harbor” rule: if the maximum deviation between the most and 
least populated districts is less than ten percent, the plan is 
presumptively compliant with one-person, one-vote.84  Deviations of 
more than ten percent are not strictly prohibited, but they are 
presumptively impermissible and shift the burden to the defendant 
jurisdiction to prove that legitimate interests justify the deviation.85  
And deviations of less than ten percent are not necessarily 
constitutional if the deviations do not serve a legitimate state 
purpose.86 
The Court has not, however, decided many cases regarding which 
population base jurisdictions must equalize in redistricting and who 
should be counted in the population base.87  While congressional 
jurisdictions use the total population, determined by the decennial 
Census, as the base population for apportionment,88 some 
circumstances warrant the use of a more narrowly defined 
population.89  Although the Court has not identified which factual 
circumstances warrant using a base other than total population, it has 
recognized that “[e]qual representation for equal numbers of people 
is a principle designed to prevent debasement of voting power and 
diminution of access to elected representatives.”90 
                                                                                                                 
measuring-district-compactness-postgis/ [https://perma.cc/H7FX-PYXU].  Reock 
scores are generated from the Reock test, which is an area-based measure that 
compares each district to a circle, which is considered to be the most compact shape 
possible. Id.  For each district, the Reock test computes the ratio of the area of the 
district to the area of the minimum enclosing circle for the district. Id.  The measure 
is always between 0 and 1, with 1 being the most compact. Id.  The Reock test 
computes one number for each district and the minimum, maximum, mean and 
standard deviation for the plan. Id.  
 84. See Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 531. 
 85. See Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973) (approving a state-legislative map 
with a deviation of 16%).  The Court has not set a numerical level above which the 
population disparity is per se intolerable, but cautioned that the 16% deviation “may 
well approach tolerable limits.” Id. at 329. 
 86. Tennant, 567 U.S. at 760–63 (holding that states must justify population 
deviations among districts with “legitimate state objectives”). 
 87. See Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1124 (2016). 
 88. Id. 
 89. See, e.g., Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 90–97 (1966) (holding that Hawaii 
could use the registered voter population because of the particular factual 
circumstances of having a substantial resident military population who were residents 
of other states for the purposes of voting and were registered to vote elsewhere). 
 90. Evenwel, 136 S. Ct. at 1132 (quoting Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 531 
(1969)). 
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B. The “Usual Residence” Rule 
The “usual residence” rule enables the Census Bureau to 
determine where people live for purposes of counting the 
population.91  The First Congress interpreted the Constitution as 
requiring that persons be counted at their “usual residence.”92  The 
Census Act of 1790, also referred to as the Enumeration Act, was 
passed to effectuate that mandate.  The Enumeration Act provided 
that “every person occasionally absent at the time of the enumeration 
[shall be counted] as belonging to that place in which he usually 
resides in the United States.”93  It is notable that the Enumeration 
Act placed no limit on the duration of a resident’s absence, which, 
“considering the modes of transportation available at the time, may 
have been quite lengthy.”94 
The term “usual residence” “can mean more than mere physical 
presence, and has been used broadly enough to include some element 
of allegiance or enduring tie to a place.”95  How, then, should 
jurisdictions determine “usual residence,” defined as “the place where 
a person lives and sleeps most of the time,” for the purposes of 
identifying the constitutionally appropriate population base to 
apportion legislative districts? 
When Congress passed the Enumeration Act, the population count 
was used only to determine a state’s population to allocate 
congressional representation, and the prison population was 
comparatively small.96  But with the unprecedented growth in 
incarceration in recent decades, and the reliance on Census data for 
state and local legislative redistricting, the inclusion of prison cells in 
our definition of “usual residence” fails to account for prisoners’ 
experience of incarceration far from home, to which they are likely to 
return.  The notion that a prison cell qualifies as a residence is 
outdated and ripe for reconsideration. 
                                                                                                                 
 91. Census Act of Mar. 1, 1790, ch. 2, § 5, 1 Stat. 101, 103 (alterations in original). 
 92. See generally id. 
 93. See id. 
 94. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 804 (1992). 
 95. Id. 
 96. See Peter Wagner, Breaking the Census: Redistricting in an Era of Mass 
Incarceration, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1241, 1242 (2012) [hereinafter Wagner, 
Breaking the Census]. 
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C. How Is the Usual Residence Rule Applied to Other Group-
Quartered Persons for Purposes of Apportionment? 
The “usual residence” definition presents a challenge for counting 
categories of persons, including prisoners, who live in “group 
quarters.”  The Census defines group quarters as “a place where 
people live or stay, in a group living arrangement, that is owned or 
managed by an entity or organization providing housing and/or 
services for the residents.”97  This definition includes federal 
personnel stationed abroad or on military bases, college students, and 
those staying in hospitals.98  Because there is limited case law specific 
to the treatment of prisoners’ residence for the purpose of 
apportioning state and local legislative districts, this section will 
describe other “group quarters” contexts to provide insight into the 
factors courts have used to determine a person’s usual residence when 
they are not in a typical household living arrangement. 
This Article argues that prisons are different from the other “group 
quarters” in a variety of ways.  First, prisoners are not in prison by 
choice.99  Second, due to the severe and purposeful isolation of 
prisons, prisoners lack economic, social, or civic ties to the 
communities just beyond the prison walls.100  Third, due to disparities 
in the criminal justice system and political dimensions to prison 
                                                                                                                 
 97. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY/PUERTO RICO 
COMMUNITY SURVEY, GROUP QUARTERS DEFINITIONS 1 (2010), 
https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/tech_docs/group_definitions/2010GQ_
Definitions.pdf [https://perma.cc/QF3V-T3FD]. 
 98. Id.  The Census Bureau’s definition of a group quarters is: 
[A] place where people live or stay, in a group living arrangement, that is 
owned or managed by an entity or organization providing housing and/or 
services for the residents.  This is not a typical household-type living 
arrangement.  These services may include custodial or medical care as well 
as other types of assistance, and residency is commonly restricted to those 
receiving these services.  People living in group quarters are usually not 
related to each other.  Group quarters include such places as college 
residence halls, residential treatment centers, skilled nursing facilities, group 
homes, military barracks, correctional facilities, and workers’ dormitories. 
Id. 
 99. See SENTENCING PROJECT UNHRC REPORT, supra note 20, at 1.  While 
individuals who are incarcerated made a choice to violate state or federal laws, law 
enforcement policies and practices, in many ways, determine who among those who 
break the law are prosecuted or convicted. See supra Section I.A.  Once an individual 
has been convicted and incarcerated, they may be transferred at will among state 
prisons or between federal prisons without choice or consent. 
 100. See Ho, supra note 6, at 374–75.  There are some criminal justice programs 
that allow or encourage contact and continued engagement with the community. See 
discussion supra note 29 (discussing individuals convicted of a crime being treated in 
smaller community-based programs and facilities close to their homes). 
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locations, the demographic incongruity between the prison 
population and the surrounding community is stark.101  All three 
factors should caution against counting prisoners as residents of their 
cells for purposes of redistricting. 
1. Allocation of Overseas Federal Employees 
Just after the 1990 Census, the Supreme Court decided Franklin v. 
Massachusetts.102  In Franklin, the state of Massachusetts and two 
individual voters sued the Department of Commerce, which houses 
the Census Bureau, claiming it had erred in deciding to include 
overseas federal employees103 in the state population count.104  Due 
to the Census designation of 922,819 overseas federal employees as 
residents of the state designated as their “home of record” in their 
personnel file, Massachusetts lost a seat in the House of 
Representatives after the 1990 decennial Census.105  Plaintiffs sought 
to have the Secretary of Commerce eliminate overseas federal 
employees entirely from the apportionment count and recalculate the 
number of Representatives per state.106  The Department of Defense, 
however, argued that “its employees should not be excluded from 
                                                                                                                 
 101. See id. at 361 (“In 173 counties nationwide, more than 50% of the purported 
African-American ‘residents’ are behind bars.  In New York, 98% of prison cells are 
located in disproportionately white State Senate districts.”). 
 102. 505 U.S. 788 (1992). 
 103. See Will 2010 Census Apportionment Population Counts Also Include Any 
Americans Overseas, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://ask.census.gov/prweb/
PRServletCustom/YACFBFye-rFIz_FoGtyvDRUGg1Uzu5Mn*/!STANDARD?py
Activity=pyMobileSnapStart&ArticleID=KCP-2692 [https://perma.cc/M9P6-W5U2] 
(“Federal employees (military and civilian) and their dependents living overseas with 
them that can be assigned to a home state.  These data are provided to the Census 
Bureau by the employing Federal departments and agencies through their 
administrative records.  Private U.S. citizens living abroad who are not affiliated with 
the Federal government (either as employees or their dependents) will not be 
included in the overseas counts.  These overseas counts are used solely for 
reapportioning seats in the U.S. House of Representatives.”). 
 104. See Franklin, 505 U.S. at 802.  The Census Bureau did not allocate overseas 
federal employees to particular states for reapportionment until 1970. See id. at 792–
93.  In 1970, the Bureau allocated members of the Armed Forces to their “home of 
record” using their Defense Department personnel records, which requires service 
members to declare their “home of record” upon entry into the military. See id. at 
793.  In 1980, the Bureau did not allocate overseas federal employees to a particular 
state. See id.  In 1990, the Census Bureau decided to allocate the Department of 
Defense’s overseas employees to their “home of record” again, declining to use a 
survey to determine their last six months of residency in the United States, their legal 
residence, or their last duty station due to practical constraints and the similarities 
between “usual residence” and “home of record” definition. See id. at 794. 
 105. Id. at 790–91. 
 106. See id. at 791. 
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apportionment counts because of the temporary and involuntary 
residence oversees.”107  Ultimately, the Department of Defense’s 
argument prevailed.108 
The Supreme Court in Franklin found the interpretations of the 
Constitution by the First Congress to be persuasive in the context of 
congressional redistricting.109  The Court determined that using 
“home of record” data to count federal employees serving overseas 
complied with Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution’s command to 
allocate congressional representatives by counting persons “in” each 
state through an “actual Enumeration” of “their respective 
Number.”110  The Court declined to disturb the Secretary of 
Commerce’s judgment that “federal employees temporarily stationed 
overseas had retained their ties to the States,” a determination made 
with reference to the individuals’ subjective intent.111  It held that the 
Secretary’s determination that “[m]any, if not most, of these military 
overseas consider themselves to be usual residents of the United 
States, even though they are temporarily assigned overseas,” is 
“consonant with, though not dictated by, the text and history of the 
Constitution.”112  The Court noted that the determination “does not 
hamper the underlying constitutional goal of equal representation, 
but, assuming that employees temporarily stationed abroad have 
indeed retained their ties to their home States, actually promotes 
equality.”113 
A number of the Court’s observations in this case are relevant to 
the question of how to count prisoners.  First, the term “usual 
residence” in the “first enumeration Act” is related to the 
constitutional phrase “in each state” and pertains to dividing 
congressional representation among states.114  In the context of 
Franklin, this simply implies that each individual must be counted 
somewhere.  Left with a choice between assigning overseas military 
personnel to the state they have designated as their “home of record” 
or not counting them at all, the Census Bureau understandably made 
the choice, approved by the Court, to include individuals stationed 
                                                                                                                 
 107. Id. at 793 (emphasis added). 
 108. Id. at 806. 
 109. See id. at 804. 
 110. See id. at 806. 
 111. Id. (emphasis added). 
 112. Id. (alterations in original) (emphasis added). 
 113. Id. (emphasis added). 
 114. Id. at 804. 
342 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLV 
overseas.115  In the context of state and local apportionment, the 
question is where to count prisoners, not whether to count them. 
Second, the Court recognized that the “in each state” language is 
more relevant when it comes to apportioning power among states (for 
congressional seats) than within a state.116  The Court gave the 
examples of students, members of Congress (who may choose 
whether to be counted in the Washington, D.C. area or in their home 
states), and “[t]hose persons who are institutionalized in out-of-state 
hospitals or jails for short terms,”117 to demonstrate that “usual 
residence” is more broadly understood than mere physical presence 
on the day of the Census. 
Third, the Court determined that the Secretary of Commerce could 
reasonably rest on the assumption that employees abroad maintained 
ties to their home state when he interpreted “usual residence” to have 
“some element of allegiance or enduring tie to a place” beyond just 
physical presence.118  The judgment to include these groups in a state 
population count, even if they are temporarily out of state, “does not 
hamper the underlying constitutional goal of equal representation,” 
but “actually promotes equality” assuming “that employees 
temporarily stationed abroad have indeed retained their ties to their 
home states.”119  Were the same reasoning applied in the context of 
prisons, it is significant that incarcerated people are significantly less 
likely to develop ties to a community in which they are involuntarily 
isolated in a prison cell, but remain tied to the community from which 
they came. 
2. Residence of Domestic Military Bases 
With regard to military personnel and redistricting, the Supreme 
Court has held that jurisdictions can, in some circumstances, properly 
exclude military personnel from the apportionment base of the 
district in which they are stationed.  In the 1966 decision Burns v. 
Richardson,120 the Court reviewed the Hawaii legislature’s interim 
                                                                                                                 
 115. See id. at 806 (noting that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate that “eliminating 
overseas employees entirely from state counts will make representation in Congress 
more equal”). 
 116. Id. at 805. 
 117. Id. at 805–06 (alterations in original). 
 118. Id. at 804 (“The term can mean more than mere physical presence, and has 
been used broadly enough to include some element of allegiance or enduring tie to a 
place.”). 
 119. Id. at 806. 
 120. 384 U.S. 73 (1966). 
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state senate apportionment scheme.121  The challenged redistricting 
plan used registered voters as the population base rather than total 
population—that is, it attempted to roughly equalize the number of 
registered voters per district across the legislative districts.122  Due to 
the presence of a large number of military personnel stationed in 
Hawaii but not registered to vote there, the use of a registered voter 
base led to “sizable differences in results [compared to those] 
produced by the distribution according to the State’s total population, 
as measured by the federal census figures.”123 
The Court approved Hawaii’s use of the registered-voter 
apportionment base as compliant with one-person, one-vote 
requirements,124 despite acknowledging that using registered voters to 
apportion state legislative seats might result in distributions of seats 
that are “substantially different” from what would have resulted from 
using a total population base.125  It held that states were not required 
to include non-voting categories in the apportionment base, such as, 
“aliens, transients, short term or temporary residents, or persons 
denied the vote for conviction of crime . . . .”126  The Court noted that 
“[t]he decision to include or exclude any such group involves choices 
about the nature of representation with which we have been shown 
no constitutionally founded reason to interfere.”127 
Other federal courts in Hawaii have also adjudicated claims with 
consideration for what the Burns court had termed “Hawaii’s special 
population problem”—a state of islands with a substantial temporary 
military population.128  Following the 2010 Census, in Kostick v. 
Nago,129 individual plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of 
Hawaii’s state legislative reapportionment plan, which had removed 
108,767 active-duty military personnel, military dependents, and non-
resident university students from the apportionment base for 
purposes of state legislative redistricting.130  The district court denied 
                                                                                                                 
 121. See id. at 73. 
 122. See id. at 86. 
 123. Id. at 90 (alterations in original). 
 124. See id. at 97. 
 125. See id. at 93. 
 126. Id. at 92 (alterations in original). 
 127. Id. (alterations in original). 
 128. Id. at 94. 
 129. 878 F. Supp. 2d 1124 (D. Haw. 2012). 
 130. See id. at 1127–28.  Ten years before Kostick, in 1992, Hawaii had amended its 
constitution to require that reapportionment of state legislative districts were based 
on permanent residents, instead of the Census count of “usual residents.” See id. at 
1127; see also HAW. CONST. art. IV § 4.  The state used “usual residence” to draw its 
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the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction and approved the 
state’s “finely tuned” work to extract permanent residents from the 
group not counted towards the total population (i.e., Hawaii did not 
exclude “the entire ‘military population’ but only non-resident 
military personnel and dependents, as well as non-resident students”) 
for purposes of districting.131  Recognizing the presence of a large 
non-resident military population, comprising about fourteen percent 
of the population, the district court approved of this fact-specific, 
non-discriminatory formulation of how to distribute political power in 
light of a large non-voting population.132 
The Kostick court noted that the difficulty of counting non-voting, 
non-permanent residents was unavoidable.133  If non-resident military 
personnel are counted in the population base, but vote elsewhere, 
residents in counties containing a military base have greater “voting 
power” than residents of other counties; but if non-resident military 
personnel are excluded, that county’s other residents may have their 
representation diluted.134   
The court also recognized the “political dimension” of districting 
decisions when it comes to combining two different politically insular 
groups or subsuming one group in another.135  Specifically, the 
“unique political and socio-economic identities” between islands 
                                                                                                                 
federal congressional districts, but “permanent residents” as the relevant population 
to draw state legislative districts. See Kostick, 878 F. Supp. 2d at 1129–30.  All three 
groups—active-duty military personnel, military dependents, and non-resident 
university students—would have been counted in the 2010 census and used for 
federal districts, but were not used for state districts. See id. at 1129.  Of course, any 
state plan must comply with the one-person one-vote requirements of the Equal 
Protection clause. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964). 
 131. Kostick, 878 F. Supp. 2d at 1142.  This distinction is important for Equal 
Protection purposes.  In Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965), the Court struck 
down Texas’s blanket rule denying all members of the armed services the franchise 
even when some of those service-men and women would have qualified as residents.  
The Burns Court distinguished Hawaii’s redistricting plan from Texas’s 
disenfranchising law in Carrington, finding it to be categorization based on 
(presumably reasonable) residency requirements, as opposed to one that is arbitrary. 
Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 92 n.21 (1966) (“The difference between exclusion 
of all military and military-related personnel, and exclusion of those not meeting a 
State’s residence requirements is a difference between an arbitrary and a 
constitutionally permissible classification.”). 
 132. See Kostick, 878 F. Supp. 2d at 1143.  A Hawaii district court had already 
rejected the use of a base population that excluded the entire military population, 
without attempting individual assignment, as a violation of the one-person, one-vote 
principle. See Travis v. King, 552 F. Supp. 554, 571 (D. Haw. 1982). 
 133. See Kostick, 878 F. Supp. 2d at 1131. 
 134. Id. at 1131–32. 
 135. Id. at 1132. 
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favored a rule that avoids bi-county districts where a legislator would 
represent very different communities on different islands.136  
Populations “have developed their own and, in some instances 
severable communities of interests” resulting in “an almost 
personalized identification” with one’s island as a community of 
interest.137  The court noted that residents of different islands “take 
great interest in the problems of their own county because of that 
very insularity brought about by the surrounding and separating 
ocean.”138  The courts may have come to a different result for the 
treatment of domestically stationed military personnel, were there 
less political or economic insularity among communities.139 
The lesson of Kostick, then, is that perhaps courts should not seek 
to create a one-size-fits-all formula for defining whether particular 
groups of non-voters must be included in a population base, but 
instead consider the political dimensions of dilution to support the 
principle of equitable electoral power and access to elected 
representatives.  Blind reliance on unadjusted Census data, or overly 
blunt cuts defining which population to include or exclude, can lead 
to problematic results. 
3. Residence of College Students 
College students present a similar quandary.  Until the 1950s, 
“college students were counted as belonging to the State where their 
parents resided, not to the State where they attended school.”140  
One-person, one-vote case law regarding college students has since 
developed, in local and statewide redistricting contexts, with 
consideration for students’ relative insularity or community ties with 
other residents of their college town. 
                                                                                                                 
 136. Id. at 1133. 
 137. Id. at 1132 (quoting Burns v. Gill, 316 F. Supp. 1285, 1291 (D. Haw. 1970)). 
 138. Burns, 316 F. Supp. at 1291. 
 139. Courts have come to a different result for the treatment of domestically 
stationed military personnel in other factual circumstances.  In a Virginia example, 
the Court considered a districting plan that relied on census data to count some 
36,000 military personnel in the state senate district where they were “home-
ported”—that is, the district containing their naval base—even though only half of 
those people actually resided in the district for purposes of voting. Mahan v. Howell, 
410 U.S. 315, 331–32 (1973).  The Court held that the scheme was unconstitutional 
because it “resulted in . . . significant population disparities.” Id.  Significantly, the 
state could not simply fall back on its reliance on Census figures without considering 
the factual implications and disparities in the effect. Id.  
 140. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 805–06 (1992). 
346 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLV 
In Borough of Bethel Park v. Stans,141 for example, the Borough of 
Bethel Park argued that the Census Bureau erred in counting college 
students as residents of the town in which they attended school.142  
The district court denied plaintiffs injunctive relief and entered 
judgment in favor of defendants.143  The Third Circuit affirmed and 
gave great deference to the Census Bureau’s decision to allocate 
college students to their school state, reasoning that once a student 
has left his parental home to pursue studies at a college in another 
state, normally for several years, it can reasonably be concluded that 
“his usual place of abode ceases to be that of his parents,” adding 
“[s]uch students usually eat, sleep, and work in the state where their 
college is located.”144  The court determined that the Census Bureau 
was entitled to limit its inquiry to objective facts as to where such a 
“usual place of abode” might be.145 
In a similar case, Boddie v. City of Cleveland,146 residents of 
Cleveland claimed that their voting rights were diluted when residents 
of a Delta State University dormitory were included in the 
apportionment base of the Cleveland School District.147  The district 
court in Boddie denied plaintiffs summary judgment, noting that “the 
distinction between resident and non-resident students must be 
emphasized.”148  The court explained that the “concept of a non-
resident dorm student . . . refer[s] to students who do not vote in local 
elections or consider themselves residents of the local voting 
district.”149  In illustrating the difference between different kinds of 
students, the Boddie court looked to the Fifth Circuit’s decision in 
Fairley v. Patterson,150 upholding a redistricting plan in which a town 
excluded from the apportionment population students who were 
unmarried, lived on the campus in dormitories or fraternity houses, 
and were shown in their college registration cards to have an address 
                                                                                                                 
 141. 449 F.2d 575 (3d Cir. 1971). 
 142. See id. at 577. 
 143. See id. 
 144. Id. at 581 (alterations in original). 
 145. See id. at 579. 
 146. (Boddie II ), No. 4:07 CV 63-M-B, 2010 WL 231749 (N.D. Miss. 2010). 
 147. See id. at *1.  In Boddie v. City of Cleveland (Boddie I ), 297 F. Supp. 2d 901, 
905–06 (N.D. Miss. 2004), the district court held that the nonresident student 
population residing in dormitories at the university should not be included in the 
apportionment base for the city’s aldermanic wards. 
 148. Boddie II, 2010 WL 231749, at *3. 
 149. See id. (alterations in original). 
 150. See id. at *4–5 (citing Fairley v. Patterson, 493 F.2d 598 (5th Cir. 1974)). 
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outside the county.151  Fairley upheld the districting plan in part 
because the town had made careful fine-grained distinctions between 
different kinds of students.152  For example, it excluded unmarried, 
non-resident, dorm-living students who lived on campus but included 
non-resident students residing off campus.153 
As with courts’ treatment of military personnel, the college student 
apportionment cases demonstrate how a careful factual review of the 
community’s insularity or community ties can be relevant to 
identifying non-residents.  Courts approved an apportionment base in 
which the locality had considered students’ ties to the college 
community versus their ties to their last address, albeit by antiquated 
indicators such as their marital status in Fairley, or the length of time 
that had passed since leaving a parent’s home in Stans.  These fact-
driven determinations necessitate an inquiry into the strength of 
students’ ties to their previous home versus their college home, which 
is also a useful analysis to perform in the prison context. 
III.  VOTE DILUTION AND PRISON GERRYMANDERING: RECENT 
ACLU LITIGATION AND DEVELOPMENTS IN PRISON 
GERRYMANDERING 
Beginning with the 2010 Census, the Census Bureau enabled, but 
did not perform, population adjustments for prisoners.154  The Bureau 
released the population data of “group quarters,” which includes 
prisons, hospitals, nursing homes, college dormitories, military 
barracks, group homes and shelters,155 early “to enable States to 
‘leave the prisoners counted where the prisons are, delete them from 
redistricting formulas, or assign them to some other locale.’”156  For 
pragmatic and administrative reasons, the Census Bureau did not 
                                                                                                                 
 151. See Fairley, 493 F.2d at 602–03.  Plaintiffs challenged the districting plan as 
unconstitutional under the one-person, one-vote standard.  Plaintiffs also challenged 
the districting method under traditional equal protection standards alleging that the 
excluded students were unreasonably classified as non-residents while others were 
included, and on Twenty-Sixth Amendment grounds. See id. 
 152. See id. at 602. 
 153. See id. (decision after review of the facts at trial). 
 154. See Fletcher v. Lamone, 831 F. Supp. 2d 887, 895–96 (D. Md. 2011), aff’d, 567 
U.S. 930 (2012). 
 155. See Group Quarters/Residence Rules, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Apr. 13, 2016), 
https://www.census.gov/topics/income-poverty/poverty/guidance/group-quarters.html 
[https://perma.cc/PYB9-MHRG]. 
 156. Fletcher, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 896 (quoting Robert Groves, So, How Do You 
Handle Prisons?, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU: DIRECTOR’S BLOG (Mar. 10, 2010), 
https://www.census.gov/newsroom/blogs/director/2010/03/so-how-do-you-handle-
prisons.html [https://perma.cc/2H93-Y79X]). 
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itself make those population adjustments,157 but the available data 
enables and supports adjusting the base population for a more 
equitable redistricting process. 
Taking into account the disenfranchisement of people with a prior 
conviction, the usual residence rule, how the geography of mass 
incarceration has skewed electoral district lines, and the fact that 
States now have the data and capacity to make population 
adjustments before redistricting, should jurisdictions change how they 
determine the residency of incarcerated persons?  States, in the first 
instance, should seek to equalize the weight of votes to prioritize 
representational equality, as explained below.158  Voting rights 
advocates, in a series of cases, have argued that representational 
equality is not appropriately served when prisoners are treated as 
residents of the district in which they are incarcerated.159   
This section addresses questions as to how localities can use Census 
data to allocate prison populations to serve the principles of equity of 
representation.  Sections III.A through III.C review two significant 
redistricting challenges to apportionment schemes where large prison 
populations were counted as residing at their place of incarceration.  
Section III.A discusses Calvin v. Jefferson County Board of 
Commissioners,160 a challenge to the apportionment of prisoners in 
county commission districts.  Section III.B introduces Evenwel v. 
Abbott,161 a recent Supreme Court decision reviewing the 
appropriate base for state legislative redistricting (unrelated to 
counting prisoners).  Section III.C discusses Davidson v. City of 
Cranston,162 a challenge to the apportionment of prisoners in local 
city ward districts.  Section III.D assesses the impact of the viability of 
the two prison districting decisions in light of the decision in Evenwel. 
                                                                                                                 
 157. Id. at 895 (quoting U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, TABULATING PRISONERS AT THEIR 
“PERMANENT HOME OF RECORD” ADDRESS 10 (2006), 
https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/media/publications/u.s.%20census%20report%20on
%20addresses%20of%20prisoners%2C%202006.pdf [https://perma.cc/7QV3-VZNG]) 
(“The Bureau has explained that counting prisoners at their home addresses would 
require ‘collecting information from each prisoner individually’ and necessitate ‘an 
extensive coordination procedure’ with correctional facilities.”); id. at 896 (“Such an 
effort would likely cost up to $250 million.”). 
 158. See Calvin v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 172 F. Supp. 3d 1292, 1303 (N.D. 
Fla. 2016). 
 159. See infra Sections III.A–C. 
 160. 172 F. Supp. 3d 1292. 
 161. 136 S. Ct. 1120 (2016). 
 162. 837 F.3d 135 (1st Cir. 2016). 
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A. Calvin v. Jefferson County Board of Commissioners: 
Understanding the Equal Protection Clause to Protect 
Representational Equality, as well as Electoral Equality 
A groundbreaking prison districting challenge, litigated by the 
ACLU of Florida, is Calvin v. Jefferson County Board of 
Commissioners,163 in which the federal district court suggested a 
workable standard for determining when prison gerrymandering 
violates the one-person, one-vote requirements of the Equal 
Protection Clause.164 
In Calvin, plaintiffs challenged a Florida county commission 
districting scheme where non-voting prisoners constituted around 
forty-two percent of the population of one single member district.165  
Jefferson County, in the Florida panhandle, has a population of 
14,761, as determined by the 2010 Census.166  The county elects five 
county board commissioners in single-member districts.167  The 
county contains Jefferson Correctional Institution (“JCI”), a state 
prison run by the Florida Department of Corrections, which 
incarcerates 1157 people.168  Nine of those prisoners were convicted 
in Jefferson County, and the rest were convicted in other parts of the 
state.169 
Plaintiffs were residents of the four single-member districts in 
Jefferson that did not contain JCI, and claimed that their votes were 
diluted by the inclusion of the prison population in the base 
apportionment population for District 3, the district in which JCI is 
located.170  The district court ruled in the plaintiffs’ favor and held 
that the county commission districting scheme violated the one-
person, one-vote standard.171  The court determined that the 
apportionment scheme served neither representational nor electoral 
equality.172  The scheme did not promote electoral equality because 
                                                                                                                 
 163. See Calvin, 172 F. Supp. 3d at 1292. 
 164. See id. 
 165. See id. at 1298. 
 166. See id. at 1297. 
 167. See id. at 1295. 
 168. See id. at 1296. 
 169. See id.; see also Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion 
for Summary Judgment, and in Opposition to Defendants’ Joint Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Calvin v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, No. 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS, 
2015 WL 12777334, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Sep. 18, 2015) (“The overwhelming majority of 
JCI prison inmates are not residents of Jefferson County, much less District 3.”). 
 170. See Calvin, 172 F. Supp. 3d at 1298. 
 171. See id. at 1326. 
 172. See id. 
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voters in District 5 had more weight to their votes than voters in the 
other districts.173  It also did not serve representational equality 
because the District 5 commissioner could not fairly be said to 
represent JCI prisoners who lacked any “representational nexus” to 
the elected commissioner in their district.174 
The Calvin court described a “representational nexus” as a 
significant component of the relationship between constituent and 
representative.175  A representational nexus does not simply rely on a 
person’s physical location within a representative’s district, but looks 
instead at “the ability of the representative to meaningfully affect that 
person’s life[.]”176  As described by the court, representatives serve 
multiple functions: as a participant in decision making on behalf of 
her district, as an advocate connecting those within her district to 
government, and as a provider of government services.177  The Calvin 
court explained that the personal interest in representational equality, 
or the “right to be represented,”178 was only served if those counted 
as constituents of a district had some representational nexus to the 
representative elected from that district.179 
To address the importance of a representational nexus as the focal 
point of the judicial inquiry, the court posed two questions: “[f]irst, 
what does a representative do for those he represents?”180  The court 
outlined three duties of a representative to his or her constituents: 
(1) she translates her constituents’ interests, explicitly or by her 
determination of what is most beneficial, when she helps make or 
influence policy decisions, including voting for or against laws; (2) she 
is an ombudsman and guide for her constituents to access the complex 
channels of government; and (3) she articulates the interests of her 
constituents, often publicly and on official records, even when she is 
                                                                                                                 
 173. See id. at 1323–24. 
 174. Id. at 1311 (“This case [is] . . . one in which a group of people lives full-time 
within a geographical boundaries of a district and yet has little, if any, 
representational nexus with the representative from that district or the legislative 
body to which he belongs.”). 
 175. See id. at 1310–11. 
 176. Id. at 1310 (alterations in original). 
 177. See id. 
 178. See id. at 1307.  The court recognized that whether it is a cognizable legal right 
is an open question, but noted that it is difficult to see why a non-voter in a district 
with an excess of people would have standing to bring an Equal Protection claim 
alleging “dilution of her representational strength,” without a comparable right to 
bring a claim for “dilution of her vote.” See id. at 1307 n.12. 
 179. See id. at 1310–11. 
 180. Id. at 1307. 
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unable to influence policy decisions, providing an “expressive element 
separate and apart from any policy-related utilitarian benefit.”181 
Second, the court asked “in what ways (besides voting) can 
someone affect the performance of the representative’s functions?”—
or what services do representatives provide their constituents?182  The 
Calvin court explained that constituents have the right to interact 
with their elected officials in a number of ways, such as through 
written communications, fundraising, protests, and at official 
events.183  Consequently, constituents can be sure their representative 
has “‘an intimate sympathy with’ those she represents.”184  
Apportionment directly affects whether a citizen’s efforts to engage 
their public officials are likely to be effective: an increase in the 
number of people in a district means each person will get “a lower 
level of services per denizen,”185 as representatives with larger 
constituencies will find themselves pulled in an increasing number of 
directions.186  Because a large population without any nexus to its 
designated representative loses the opportunity for representation, 
counting that population within the representative’s district does not 
serve the principle of representational equality behind equalizing 
districts’ populations.187 
Next, to determine whether the apportionment scheme serves 
representational equality, the court asked whether there is “a large 
number of nonvoters whose representational nexus with the 
legislative body is substantially different—different in kind, not just 
degree—from the typical person present in the legislative body’s 
jurisdiction.”188  This begs the question of whether a category of 
residents, here prisoners, has a very different relationship with the 
representative—unable to vote for, engage with, or seek effective 
assistance from him or her—than other residents.  Or, as the court 
explained, “whether the population at issue is similarly situated in any 
relevant way to the typical denizens and/or voters of the jurisdiction 
with respect to the legislative body.”189 
                                                                                                                 
 181. Id. at 1307–08. 
 182. Id. at 1307. 
 183. See id. at 1308–09. 
 184. Id. at 1309. 
 185. Id. (characterizing Garza v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763, 781 (9th Cir. 
1990) (Kozinski, J., dissenting in relevant part)). 
 186. See id. at 1309 (citations omitted). 
 187. See id. at 1321. 
 188. Id. at 1315 n.20. 
 189. Id. 
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Based on this line of inquiry, the court found that prisoners indeed 
lack a representational nexus to their elected representatives.190  It 
reasoned that all aspects of prison life are controlled by prison 
officials and state level administrators.191  While prisoners are not 
completely divorced from the outside world—they have access to 
medical care and fire-fighting and trash collection services—the 
isolation and control by state-level entities, particularly the state 
Department of Corrections, renders the commissioners relatively 
impotent to regulate inmates’ lives.192  Additionally, county social and 
economic policy decisions do not meaningfully affect inmates.193  This 
observation should be unsurprising: it is consistent with the purpose 
of incarceration, which is to isolate incarcerated persons from 
society.194  Prisoners’ isolation from the surrounding community 
prevents nearly all political engagement with their representatives.  
With regard to equalizing total population, the court held that an 
equal population did not always adequately serve representational 
equality.195  The court explained, “disparities in total census 
population . . . are not in and of themselves unconstitutional.”196  The 
safe harbor rule in one-person, one-vote cases is a rebuttable 
presumption that a deviation of less than ten percent of total 
population is permissible for state and local districts.197  The safe 
harbor rule is an evidentiary rule of burden-shifting and not a 
substantive constitutional construction.198  The safe harbor rule 
cannot possibly cover every circumstance, since population deviations 
must serve a legitimate state interest.199  The court in Calvin found 
that the rule could not be mechanically applied in Jefferson County—
with a relatively small district and a comparatively large block of non-
voters—because it was “not designed to be used in a factual situation 
                                                                                                                 
 190. See id. at 1316. 
 191. See id. 
 192. See id. at 1316–18. 
 193. See id. at 1317. 
 194. See id. at 1319. 
 195. See id. at 1314–15; see also Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 740 (1983).  For 
proponents of electoral equality, equalizing total population is also not an end in 
itself, but instead the means of achieving electoral equality. Calvin, 172 F. Supp. 3d at 
1311 (citing Garza v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763, 783 (9th Cir. 1990) (Kozinski, 
J., dissenting in relevant part)). 
 196. Calvin, 172 F. Supp. 3d at 1311. 
 197. See id. 
 198. See id. at 1314. 
 199. See generally Tennant v. Jefferson Cty. Comm’n, 567 U.S. 758 (2012). 
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such as this one.”200  Applying the fact-intensive representational 
nexus test will avoid this pitfall. 
Overall, the court sets forth a three-part methodology to determine 
whether the population base used for districting violates one-person 
one-vote principles: (1) start with the Census total population;201 (2) 
identify what group is excluded and determine “if it is not similarly 
situated to the remainder of the population either with respect to 
citizenship (that is, ability to vote), residency, or denizenship . . . the 
fit has to be fairly good—better than would be required for rational 
basis review”;202 and (3) even if no group is sought to be excluded, a 
review of the factual circumstances of the claim is still necessary.203  
The Census baseline must be examined because “it may be the case 
that the census count itself makes choices inconsistent with the Equal 
Protection Clause.”204  Put another way, the Census might include a 
group not similarly situated in any relevant respect.205  This inquiry 
seeks to determine whether a category of “residents” have a very 
different relationship to the local democratic process and their 
assigned representative than other residents in the district to apply 
the “representational nexus” criteria to the established one-person 
one-vote framework.206 
Ultimately, the court held that Jefferson County’s inclusion of 
prisoners in its redistricting population base diluted the 
representational strength of individuals in other districts, and violated 
the Equal Protection Clause.207  The Calvin court reached this 
conclusion because the prisoners “comprise a (1) large number of 
(2) nonvoters who (3) lack a meaningful representational nexus with 
the [County] Boards, and . . . [are] (4) packed into a small subset of 
legislative districts.”208  Calvin could be seen as a special case because 
the incarcerated population was so large relative to the small district 
that it created a population deviation of 42.63% among districts.209  
Critics also might claim that this case could create a slippery slope, 
forcing courts to contemplate which individuals are “worthy” of being 
considered part of a locality’s population data in an increasing 
                                                                                                                 
 200. Calvin, 172 F. Supp. 3d at 1315. 
 201. See id. at 1313. 
 202. Id. (alterations in original). 
 203. See id. 
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 205. See id. at 1313–14. 
 206. See id. 
 207. Id. at 1315. 
 208. Id. (alterations in original). 
 209. See id. at 1323. 
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number of contexts, for example: should an apportionment base 
include minors, non-citizens, or citizens disenfranchised due to a 
conviction.210  This case does not, however, raise the specter of a 
slippery slope because prisoners are different than other non-voting 
groups211 and the court reviewed the facts specific to state prisoners, 
their nexus to representatives in local government, and substantial 
population disparities created by counting prisoners as residents.212 
But even if Calvin presents a relatively extreme set of facts, the 
same principles apply to most prison contexts.  The factors that lead 
courts to exclude other groups from the apportionment base are all 
present in incarcerated populations.213  A case decided by the 
Supreme Court two weeks after the district court’s decision in Calvin 
would not necessitate a different result. 
B. Does Evenwel v. Abbott Change the Analysis of Whether 
Persons Incarcerated Are Residents of Their Prison Cell or Home 
Address? 
Between the District Court’s decision in Calvin and the Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit’s decision in a similar case later that 
same year, the Supreme Court decided Evenwel v. Abbott,214 which 
did not raise prison districting questions, but addressed the 
appropriate base for state legislative apportionment.215  Although this 
case does not involve prison gerrymandering, it addresses some of the 
principles at issue in prison gerrymandering cases. 
In Evenwel, the plaintiffs, Texas voters, argued that only the vote-
eligible population should be included in the apportionment base for 
redistricting.216  They claimed that one-person, one-vote 
constitutional principles prohibited Texas from drawing its legislative 
district lines on the basis of total population because doing so would 
violate “voter equality.”217  Instead, plaintiffs argued that the State 
should use eligible voters as the applicable population base, removing 
                                                                                                                 
 210. See id. at 1324 (referencing defendants’ “slippery slope” argument regarding 
apportionment). 
 211. See supra Section II.C. 
 212. See Calvin, 172 F. Supp. 3d at 1324. 
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 216. See id. 
 217. See id. at 1126. 
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others—including non-citizens and minors—from the districting 
count.218   
The State of Texas took the slightly different position that its “use 
of total-population data from the census was permissible,” but that 
the Constitution also allows for it to use Census survey estimates of 
the citizen voting age population (“CVAP”)219 as the redistricting 
base.220  The United States filed a statement of interest that agreed 
with Texas that the Equal Protection Clause does not mandate the 
use of the voter-eligible population for apportionment, and urged the 
Court not to address the question of whether the Constitution allows 
States to use the voter-eligible population as an alternative 
population base for redistricting.221   
The Court held that Texas’s practice of drawing its legislative 
districts based on total population, rather than the voter-eligible 
population, satisfied one-person, one-vote principles and was 
therefore permissible.222  The decision recognized principles 
consistent with representational equality.223  As the Supreme Court 
explained in Kirkpatrick v. Preisler,224 the principle that there ought 
to be equal representation for equal numbers of people is designed to 
prevent debasement of voting power and diminution of access to 
                                                                                                                 
 218. See id. 
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more information, see American Community Survey, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
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elected representatives.225  Evenwel maintained the import of the 
principles in Kirkpatrick.226  
C. Davidson v. City of Cranston 
While the district court in Calvin relied on the concept of 
representational equality, in a similar case, Davidson v. City of 
Cranston,227 the First Circuit rejected a district court’s decision that 
was similar in its reasoning to Calvin and instead held that including 
non-voting prisoners in an electoral apportionment base was 
consistent with one-person, one-vote requirements.228 
Davidson involved a challenge to a redistricting plan that included 
3433 incarcerated people of the Adult Correctional Institution 
(“ACI”) in the population count for a local city ward in the City of 
Cranston, Rhode Island.229  With this allocation, a full twenty-five 
percent of the ward population was incarcerated and could not 
vote.230  The district court denied the city’s motion to dismiss the 
lawsuit, finding that its redistricting plan—in which the ACI 
population was counted within one of the city’s six wards—was not 
justified by principles of electoral equality since the people 
incarcerated at ACI “do[ ] not participate in any aspect of the City’s 
civic life.”231  The district court held that “the inclusion of the ACI 
prison population is not advancing the principle of electoral equality 
because the majority of prisoners, pursuant to the State’s 
Constitution, cannot vote, and those who can . . . vote by absentee 
ballot from their pre-incarceration address.”232 
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The First Circuit reversed the district court and determined that 
the City of Cranston was not required to exclude people in prison 
from the apportionment process and that the Constitution does not 
give the federal courts the power to interfere with Cranston’s decision 
to include them.233  The First Circuit interpreted Evenwel to stand for 
three propositions.  First, in its view, Evenwel “did not disturb 
Supreme Court precedent that apportionment claims involving only 
minor deviations normally require a showing of invidious 
discrimination.”234  So long as equal population distribution 
requirements are met, the First Circuit held that a plaintiff must show 
intentional discrimination to make out an Equal Protection claim.235  
Second, absent a showing of intentional discrimination, the First 
Circuit held that “Evenwel reinforces the principle that federal courts 
must give deference to decisions by local election authorities related 
to apportionment.”236  Third, the First Circuit determined that 
Evenwel “approved the status quo of using total population from the 
Census for apportionment.”237 
D. Reconciling Calvin, Evenwel, and Davidson to Create a 
Functional Framework for Apportioning Incarcerated Persons 
The federal courts that have addressed the issue of prison 
districting did not resolve the question of whether, for apportionment 
purposes, prisoners should be counted in the place where they lived 
prior to incarceration or in the place where they were involuntarily 
confined at the time of the Census.  The Evenwel decision likewise 
does not answer this question, only a far more general question of 
whether a state’s use of total population is a permissible 
apportionment base for drawing state legislative districts.238 
Permitting the use of total population in Evenwel is not 
inconsistent with challenging prison districting in the Calvin case and 
the Davidson case.239  The Court in Evenwel, although it did not 
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 234. Id. at 141. 
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address prison gerrymandering, articulated general apportionment 
goals and principles that can be read to support counting prisoners in 
their home districts in most instances.240  Evenwel maintained the 
equal population rule that “[s]tates must draw congressional districts 
with populations as close to perfect equality as possible,”241 but its 
reasoning in support of population equality does not undermine 
claims of unlawful dilution due to prison gerrymandering.242 
While the Court in Evenwel rejected plaintiffs’ argument that the 
Constitution requires states to exclude ineligible voters from their 
population counts, it did not specifically address the appropriate place 
to count any particular group of non-voting persons.243  Where then 
should prisoners be counted for apportionment purposes: the place 
where they lived prior to incarceration, or the place where they were 
involuntarily confined at the time of the Census? 
In many ways, the principles articulated in Evenwel could support 
the exclusion of prison populations from the districts in which they 
are incarcerated. 
The Court’s support for total population as a permissive 
apportionment base does not conflict with the representational and 
electoral equality principles, as articulated in Calvin, in the prison 
gerrymandering context.  In Evenwel, the Court highlighted states’ 
“interest in taking reasonable, nondiscriminatory steps to facilitate 
access [to representatives] for all its residents” in response to Texas’s 
argument that constituents (presumably the non-voting variety) “have 
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 241. Id. at 1124 (alterations in original) (citing Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 
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 243. See Evenwel, 136 S. Ct. at 1132–33. 
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no constitutional right to equal access to their elected 
representatives.”244  The Court explained that non-voters have an 
“important stake in many policy debates . . . and in receiving 
constituent services, such as help navigating public-benefits 
bureaucracies.”245  It concluded that “by ensuring that each 
representative is subject to requests and suggestions from the same 
number of constituents, total-population apportionment promotes 
equitable and effective representation.”246 
This reasoning does not necessarily support an apportionment base 
that includes prisoners, who are distinct from other non-voting groups 
in three ways.  First, they are subject to a different system of services 
from those living around them because they are dependent on the 
company imprisoning them for all of their needs.  With few 
exceptions, they are prohibited from accessing external public 
benefits.247  Second, prisoners do not become eligible voters again 
until after they complete their sentence and re-locate, so unlike 
minors or non-citizens, they cannot become a voter over the course of 
their “residence” (for prisoners, their incarceration) in the district.  
Indeed, even if they later become vote-eligible constituents, their 
voting rights are revived only upon relocation to their post-
incarceration home community.  Third, in other contexts, members of 
the same family or community, who often share interests, can 
advocate for the non-voters in their community, including their 
children or other family members and neighbors, with whom they 
have close ties.  Prisoners cannot form community ties with the 
community surrounding the prison because they are, by design, kept 
isolated. 
Moreover, even though the Evenwel Court declined to mandate 
using the vote-eligible population as a redistricting base, the Court 
left the door open to other approaches.  It recognized that many 
states adjust total population data according to states’ other 
constitutional or statutory requirements.248  Evenwel noted that ten 
states authorize the removal of certain groups from the total-
population apportionment base; three states exclude certain non-
permanent residents, including nonresident members of the 
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military.249  The Court specifically recognized that four states—
California, Delaware, Maryland, and New York—adjust total 
population data to exclude incarcerated persons who were domiciled 
out-of-state prior to incarceration.250  And the Evenwel decision 
seemingly left in place the expectation that adjustments must be 
systematic, an undertaking that presents less of a problem for group 
residencies like prisons than it would for, say, students,251 since 
apportionment base adjustments for prisoners became readily 
administrable with the 2010 Census.252  In all, the principles behind a 
representational nexus and representational equality, described in 
Calvin, gain support in Evenwel.  Those principles cannot be served 
unless prisoners are appropriately assigned to their home district. 
IV.  DEVELOPMENTS IN NEW YORK AND MARYLAND SINCE 2010 
Despite challenges to the more pronounced instances of prison 
gerrymandering like Calvin and Davidson, litigation alone cannot 
solve all the permutations of representational inequity.  Litigating in 
each of the 5393 Census blocks that contain prisons would be 
impossible.253  A combination of litigation and legislative campaigns 
are necessary to mitigate the problem of representational inequality 
due to prison gerrymandering.  Improvements in New York and 
Maryland since the last decennial Census provide some examples. 
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Part IV examines statutory changes and state court challenges since 
2010 that improved methods for determining prisoners’ homes.  
Section IV.A describes legislation and state court litigation resulting 
in changes to the apportionment of prisoners in New York.  Section 
IV.B reviews state legislation and federal litigation to count prisoners 
at their home addresses in Maryland. 
A. New York: Little v. LATFOR 
Until 2010, New York counted prisoners as residents of the 
location in which they were incarcerated, not in their home districts 
where they are likely to return after serving their sentence.254  In 
2012, following the 2010 decennial Census, the New York State 
legislature passed section 71(8) of the New York Corrections Law, 
requiring the state to count prisoners in their home communities for 
the purposes of state redistricting.255  The statute put the onus on the 
Department of Corrections to report each prisoner’s residential 
address prior to incarceration to the state legislative task force on 
demographic research and reapportionment.256  The independent 
redistricting commission would then allocate the imprisoned 
population accordingly.257 
The legislation was a long time coming.  In years prior, when New 
York State counted prisoners as residents of the prison in which they 
were incarcerated, the misallocation severely skewed the state 
legislative districting lines throughout the state.  For example, seven 
of New York’s sixty-three state senators only met the safe-harbor 
population requirement because the state considered incarcerated 
persons residents of the prison district.258  Had prisoners been 
counted in their home district, the population in those seven districts 
containing prisons would have been underpopulated (deviated more 
than ten percent from the population of other districts).259  This is a 
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result of the state imprisoning individuals far from their home 
communities.  Although forty-five percent of all people in New York 
State prisons came from New York City, only four of the state’s fifty-
five prisons are located in New York City.260  The remainder of state 
prisons are located in upstate, rural, predominantly white 
communities: “approximately seventy-five percent of New York’s 
prisons are located more than one hundred miles from New York 
City, more than sixty percent are located over two hundred miles 
from the city, and over a third are located more than three hundred 
miles from the city.”261 
Given racial disparities in incarceration, imprisoning individuals far 
from their home communities produces a large, racially 
disproportionate effect.  “The incarceration rate for African 
Americans in New York is nine and a half times that of whites; for 
Latinos it is four and a half times that of whites.”262  These disparities 
result in an incarcerated population in New York that is around 
seventy-three percent African-American or Latino.263  At the same 
time, “virtually all—[ninety-eight percent]—of New York state’s 
prison cells were located in state senate districts that are 
disproportionately White, diluting the votes of African-American and 
Latino voters.”264 
Counting prisoners as residents of their prison district strengthens 
the vote of non-incarcerated residents of the prison district, even 
though those residents lack any engagement with the prison 
population and may have interests diametrically opposed to those of 
the prisoners.  At the same time, this practice dilutes the vote of 
prisoners’ home communities, despite even a short stay in prison,265 
during which they are disenfranchised.266  This is particularly stark in 
New York: nearly a quarter of those incarcerated come from only 
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seven out of sixty-three state senate districts representing minority 
communities in New York City.267 
Following the passage of Part XX, the legislative precursor to 
section 71(8) of the New York Corrections Law, Republican State 
Senator Elizabeth Little of the 45th District—which contains 12,000 
incarcerated persons—and others challenged the constitutionality of 
the new law in Little v. Legislative Task Force on Demographic 
Research and Reapportionment (“LATFOR”).268  Plaintiffs argued 
that the new law violated the New York constitutional requirement 
that “the federal census taken in the year nineteen hundred thirty and 
each federal census taken decennially thereafter shall be controlling 
as to the number of inhabitants in the state or any part thereof for the 
purposes of the apportionment.”269  The New York Civil Liberties 
Union, along with fourteen other organizations and individuals, 
intervened for defendants, arguing that treating them or their 
members as residents of a prison “artificially inflates the voting 
strength of those who live in districts where prisons are located, and 
dilutes the voting strength of every New Yorker who lives in a district 
that does not house a state prison.”270 
On December 1, 2011, a New York state trial court upheld the law 
as constitutional.271  The court noted that while the Census Bureau 
found it would be highly difficult to collect residential data for every 
incarcerated person, it agreed that states were free to decide what 
constituted an incarcerated person’s “usual residence” for 
redistricting purposes, whether it is the prison location, their pre-
incarceration address, or another formula altogether.272  The court 
recognized the Census Bureau’s 2010 early release of “group 
quarters” data to allow states to count incarcerated persons at their 
home locations, if they choose to.273  With regard to the one-person, 
one-vote question, the court determined that counting prisoners at 
their home address was permissible and distinct from treatment of 
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both college students and military personnel because prisoners’ stays 
within their prison districts lack permanency.274  Most significantly, 
the court recognized prisoners’ lack of ties to, and the separation of 
their interests from, the community surrounding the prison: for 
instance, incarcerated persons do not attend local schools or use other 
public facilities.275  The court notes that the sponsor of the challenged 
legislation “sought to rectify ‘electoral inequalities’” that were 
created by counting incarcerated individuals as part of the districts in 
which they are temporarily and involuntarily held.276  Like Calvin, the 
LATFOR decision was a decisive victory for both electoral and 
representational equality. 
On February 14, 2012, the New York Court of Appeals declined to 
hear an appeal.277  And on March 13, 2012, the plaintiffs withdrew 
their appeal.278  The 2012 cycle of redistricting proceeded under the 
new law. 
B. Maryland: Fletcher v. Lamone 
Another example of courts’ willingness to rectify the vote dilution 
from miscounting people in prisons occurred in Fletcher v. 
Lamone.279  The case addressed a 2010 Maryland law, the No 
Representation Without Population Act, which was enacted to 
“correct census data for the distortional effects of the Census 
Bureau’s practice of counting prison inmates as residents of their 
place of incarceration.”280  The No Representation Without 
Population Act removed incarcerated citizens from the population 
count of where they were incarcerated and instead reassigned them to 
their home address.281 
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The distortional effects of Maryland’s prior method of 
apportionment stemmed from the fact that the majority of Maryland’s 
state prisoners come from areas with a majority Black population, 
and the state’s prisons are located primarily in the majority white 
districts.282  Specifically, the incarcerated population in Maryland 
comes largely from the state capital, Baltimore, an urban hub.283  
After the 2000 Census, however, the state’s largest prisons were (and 
are still) “located in the overwhelmingly White First and Sixth 
districts on the Eastern Shore and in Western Maryland, 
respectively.”284  For example, District 6 contained 6754 incarcerated 
people.285  Both of these districts are in rural parts of the state.  If 
those prisoners were properly “credited” to their home districts, the 
two majority African American districts, Districts 4 and 7, would 
receive 1629 and 4832 people, respectively.286 
The distortive effect of counting people where they are 
incarcerated results in particularly perverse outcomes in Maryland.  
The court raised one such example: District 1 of the Somerset County 
Council was created in the 1980s as a majority-minority district in 
order to settle a Voting Rights Act lawsuit.287  Soon after it was 
created, “because the largely minority population of Eastern 
Correctional Institute was counted in the district’s population for 
redistricting purposes, only a small number of African Americans 
who ‘reside’ in the district were actually eligible to vote.  As a result, 
an African-American was not elected to fill the seat until 2010.”288 
As a result of Maryland counting people where they are 
incarcerated, residents of districts with prisons were systematically 
“overrepresented” compared to other districts.289  To rectify the 
imbalance, the No Representation Without Population Act required 
that for local, state, and federal redistricting, “inmates of state or 
federal prisons located in Maryland must be counted as residents of 
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their last known residence before incarceration.”290  Moreover, 
“[p]risoners who were not Maryland residents prior to incarceration 
are excluded from the population count, and prisoners whose last 
known address cannot be determined are counted as residents of the 
district where their facility is located.”291  The subsequent lawsuit 
sought to maintain the pre-2010 power imbalance.292  Not one of the 
plaintiffs lived in District 4 or 7, the majority-minority districts that 
would be “credited” the most residents and whose residents would 
regain the equal strength of their voting rights.293 
The court granted summary judgment to defendants and upheld 
the Act as constitutional.294  Like LATFOR, Fletcher provides an 
example of a state legislative initiative to address inequity, which was 
approved by a court.  Following the decision in Fletcher, Maryland 
has created more equitable districts by counting prisoners as members 
of their home community.295  At the same time, Maryland has also 
liberalized its felony disenfranchisement laws.  Effective March 10, 
2016, citizens convicted of a felony who completed their prison term 
automatically had their right to vote restored and immediately 
became eligible to register and vote upon release.296  The new law 
immediately restored voting rights to approximately 40,000 people.297  
Together, these two remedial measures in Maryland began to restore 
democracy. 
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 291. Id. (alterations in original). 
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 295. See generally PETER WAGNER & OLIVIA CUMMINGS, PRISON POLICY 
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 296. MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 3-102 (West 2016). 
 297. Voting Rights Restoration in Maryland, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE 
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V.  USING REPRESENTATIONAL EQUALITY FRAMEWORK: 
PRISONERS’ “USUAL RESIDENCE” SHOULD BE THEIR HOME, NOT 
THEIR CELL, AND REDISTRICTING SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN 
ACCORDINGLY 
If there ever were “severable communities of interest” with unique 
political and socio-economic identities,298 it is prisoners and the 
community that surrounds a prison.  When the interests of people in 
prisons are diametrically opposed to others within their district, 
including those who are in the business of imprisoning them (for 
example, corrections, healthcare, or catering contractors of the 
prison), local elected representatives have little incentive to serve the 
interests of their temporary, non-voting, incarcerated constituents. 
Section V.A explains why prisons are substantively different from 
other “group quartered” residents and why people in prison should, 
as a default rule, be considered residents of the home they inhabited 
prior to their incarceration or intend to return to, not their prison cell.  
Sections V.B and V.C explain why the data collected and produced by 
the Census Bureau are administratively expedient, but not 
determinative of the appropriate base population for redistricting.  
Section V.D looks forward to the 2020 Census and describes, briefly, 
options for states to ‘move’ their prisoner population back to the 
prisoners’ pre-incarceration addresses for purposes of redistricting. 
A. Prisoners Are Different 
Federal courts have, in many instances, recognized characteristics 
of students and military base residents that resonate for prisoners, 
such as ties to a prior residence from which they came and to which 
they likely intend to return.299  Put simply, treating students, military 
base residents, and prisoners differently than other residents makes 
sense.  But even the assumption that college students, military base 
residents, and prisoners are similarly situated to each other is 
                                                                                                                 
 298. Kostik v. Nago, 878 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1132 (D. Haw. 2012). 
 299. See, e.g., Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 95 (1996); Fairley v. Patterson, 493 
F.2d 598, 602–03 (5th Cir. 1974); Kostick, 878 F. Supp. 2d at 1144; Boddie v. 
Cleveland Sch. Dist., NO. 4:07CV63-M-B, 2010 WL 231749, at *3 (D. Miss. Jan. 14, 
2010); discussion supra Sections II.B.2, II.B.3; see also Borough of Bethel Park v. 
Stans, 449 F.2d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 1971) (holding that there is a rational basis for 
counting inmates as residents of their prison because they “usually stay for long 
periods of time”).  The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit presumed in Borough 
of Bethel Park that “[p]eople in this category [prisoners] as distinguished from, for 
example, those temporarily in a hospital for a short duration, often have no other 
fixed place of abode, and the length of their institutional stay is often indefinite.” Id. 
Even if this presumption was accurate at the time, it no longer is accurate today. 
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“questionable at best.”300  Both students and military base residents 
have a more “substantial connection to, and effect on, the 
communities where they reside than do prisoners.”301  Indeed, one of 
the purposes of incarceration is to isolate prisoners from surrounding 
populations. 
Prisoners have no choice but to “reside” at their prison location, 
distinguishing them from, for instance, students who may choose 
where to eat, sleep, and work, as referenced by the Third Circuit in 
Borough of Bethel Park.302  Prisoners are prohibited from deciding 
where they are held and can be transferred at the discretion of 
corrections officials.303  Often they are held far from their home 
communities, despite the strain this places on maintaining familial 
relationships.304 
More significantly, prisoners cannot vote.305  Both students and 
military service members and their dependents not only have a choice 
in where they live, but, depending on what they consider their 
permanent home, they choose where they vote, whereas prisoners 
convicted of a felony in all but two states do not have the right at 
all.306  Treating non-voting prisoners as residents of their true home 
district, therefore, serves the representational equality principles 
discussed in Calvin and Fletcher.307  Prisoners’ status as distinct, 
insular, and non-voting constituents is significant in three ways. 
                                                                                                                 
 300. Fletcher v. Lamone, 831 F. Supp. 2d 887, 896 (D. Md. 2011). 
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(D. Fla. 2016); Fletcher v. Lamone, 831 F. Supp. 2d 887, 896 (D. Md. 2011); see also 
discussion supra Section III.D. 
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First, prisoners are non-voting constituents without a 
representational nexus to local representatives, whereas military 
personnel and students have a stronger nexus, particularly if they vote 
locally, or have the option to vote locally by self-defining their 
permanent home.  In Fletcher, the Court found the “assumption” that 
“college students, soldiers, and prisoners are all similarly situated 
groups” to be “questionable at best,”308 specifically because “college 
students and members of the military are eligible to vote, while 
incarcerated persons are not.”309  In that sense, districts containing 
non-voting prisoners create more robust representation for the 
residents of the district who are not incarcerated.  This takes 
representational weight away from the residents of districts from 
which the prisoners came and to which they are likely to return. 
Second, because of the disparities in the criminal justice system, the 
people incarcerated often hail from communities extremely different 
from the prison towns in which they are incarcerated.310  The interests 
of the imprisoned population and the population of towns 
surrounding prisons diverge substantially.311  Prisons are often placed 
in disproportionately white, more rural districts than prisoners’ home 
districts.312  Between skewed criminal justice enforcement and the 
skewed incentives to build prisons to stimulate local economies, there 
is often a vast divide between incarcerated people and the residents 
surrounding a prison. 
Third, not only do people in prison lose their right to vote, they 
also lose the ability to participate in outside community life.  Prisons 
                                                                                                                 
 308. Fletcher, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 896. 
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 310. See discussion supra Part I. 
 311. See Ho, supra note 6, at 371. 
 312. In the state of New York, all new prisons constructed since 1982 have been 
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allow for only a limited connection between people incarcerated and 
the residents of the community surrounding the prison and few 
opportunities to politically engage.  By contrast, college students and 
military personnel can choose to engage their surrounding 
communities in civic life.  In this sense, “both groups have a much 
more substantial connection to, and effect on, the communities where 
they reside than do prisoners.”313  According to the factors federal 
courts have considered as relevant to cases challenging how college 
students, military base residents, and overseas federal employees are 
counted,314 prisoners should, by default, be counted in their home 
community to serve principles of representative equality. 
B. The Census Bureau’s Continued Use of the “Usual Residence” 
Rule Is Not Determinative 
As explained above, the “usual residence” rule does not reflect the 
living situation of the nation’s more than two million prisoners, nor 
does it take into account the significant growth of the prison 
population over the past thirty years and its distortive effect on 
democracy.  By calling prison cells residences, “the Census Bureau 
concentrated a normally city-based population that is 
disproportionately male and African-American or Latino into just 
5393 Census blocks that are located far from their actual homes and 
often in rural areas.”315  In fact, to determine a person’s legal 
residence outside of the apportionment context, “most states have 
explicit constitutional provisions or statutes that declare that a prison 
cell is not a residence.”316  Moreover, the Census Bureau’s use of 
“usual residence” is at odds with other governmental uses of the term, 
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which, for example, do not consider a person’s location in prison as 
sufficient for diversity jurisdiction in federal courts or sufficient to 
allow their children to attend a local public school.317  Redistricting 
should follow the trend of counting incarcerated people at a home 
location. 
The Census Bureau data are just that: data.  Even if the Census 
does not directly calculate adjustments for people in prison, the data 
it provides enables states to do so.318  The Bureau counts people 
where they are incarcerated for pragmatic and administrative reasons, 
not legal ones.319  “The Bureau has explained that counting prisoners 
at their home addresses would require ‘collecting information from 
each prisoner individually’ and necessitate ‘an extensive coordination 
procedure’” with correctional facilities, which would cost upward of 
$250 million.320  For the 2010 Census, the Bureau made the tools 
available for states to make those adjustments by releasing its 
population data for “group quarters” early to enable states to “leave 
the prisoners counted where the prisons are, delete them from 
redistricting formulas, or assign them to some other locale.”321  States 
should use the available data to reconsider their treatment of people 
in prison in the redistricting process. 
CONCLUSION 
In forty-four states, prisoners are treated as residents of their 
prison cell for the purposes of creating electoral districts, although 
they themselves cannot vote, and are likely to return to their home 
community after serving their term of incarceration.322  Those sent to 
prison are disproportionately people of color and disproportionately 
come from urban areas.323  Prisons, however, are increasingly located 
in more rural areas, among disproportionately white, more 
conservative populations.324  Given the potential incongruity between 
non-voting prisoners’ political interests and the political interests of 
residents of the districts where prisons are located, peoples’ homes 
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prior to their incarceration, not their prison cells, should be treated as 
their usual residence to serve constitutional principles underlying the 
one-person, one-vote requirements.325 
Designating peoples’ pre-incarceration home as their usual 
residence is consistent with the factors considered in courts’ treatment 
of residents of other group quarters, including college students, 
residents of military bases, and overseas federal employees.326  Due to 
prisoners’ severe isolation from, and lack of ties to, surrounding 
communities, the finite term of their incarceration, their lack of 
agency in deciding the location of their incarceration, and 
importantly, their status as non-voters in forty-eight states, their home 
prior to incarceration would be more appropriately designated as 
their usual residence than a prison cell.327 
A district’s residents who are able to vote for, access, and hold 
accountable local representatives often have interests divergent from 
their incarcerated neighbors, correlating, in part, to the urban-rural 
and racial differences in those two populations.328  Legislators in 
districts containing a prison have no representational nexus to their 
incarcerated constituents who cannot vote, take their concerns to 
their representatives, or seek redress for the issues that affect their 
daily lives.329  The court’s decision in Calvin, finding that local district 
lines violated one-person, one-vote constitutional requirements is 
consistent with principles of representational equality, electoral 
equality, and the requirements of the Evenwel decision recently 
announced by the Supreme Court.330  
Counting incarcerated people as residents of their cells over-
weights the voting strength of a prison district’s non-incarcerated 
residents and dilutes the voting strength of the residents of 
surrounding districts.331  As we look toward the 2020 decennial 
Census and subsequent redistricting, states and localities have an 
opportunity to promote representational equality by “moving” the 
prison population for purposes of apportionment back to a home 
address.  Doing so serves the principles of representational and 
electoral equality underlying the one-person, one-vote standard, and 
the values of a fair and representative democracy. 
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